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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, S 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 870585-CA 
v. : 
GREG PHILLIP CASIAS, aka GREG : 
PHIL CASIAS, aka JOHN PAUL 
SANCHEZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant's judgments and commitments of three second 
degree felonies were filed in the district court on December 10, 
1987 (R. 120). Defendant's notice of appeal was filed with the 
Summit County District Court on December 14, 1987 (R. 124), and 
the notice of appeal was filed with this Court on December 22, 
1987 (R. 125). Under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(f)(Supp. 1988), 
and under Utah Court of Appeals Rule 4(a), jurisdiction is proper 
in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Were the palm print exhibits properly admitted? 
II. Was defendant properly charged with theft of 
property over $1,000 and theft of a firearm? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Determinative constitutional and statutory provisions 
are set out fully, as they appear in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information filed on June 23, 
1987, with attempted burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-4-101, and Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202(1); two counts of 
burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1); and four 
counts of theft, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (R. 
2,3). Arraignment was held in the Fifth Circuit Court of Summit 
County (R. 8), and preliminary hearing began on August 18, 1987 
(R. 15). At the preliminary hearing, defendant waived the 
reading of the information (R. 15), and he was bound over on some 
of the charges, reflected in the amended information (R. 40-41). 
On November 3, 1987, defendant was convicted by a jury of 
burglary; theft of a firearm; and theft (R. 110-112). 
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years 
for each of the second degree felony convictions, the sentences 
to run concurrently to each other and consecutively to a 
different sentence that defendant was serving on a previous 
conviction (R. 119). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 14, 1987, Bradley Steven Browning was in his 
home located at 360 Matterhorn Drive in Summit Park, Summit 
County, Utah (T. 57-58). At approximately eight o'clock in the 
morning, Mr. Browning looked out the sliding door to his backyard 
to see a strange man, whom he later identified as Greg Phillip 
Casias, standing between ten and fifteen feet from the door, 
staring at the door casings (T. 59). No one had permission to be 
in Mr. Browning's backyard on that morning (T. 74). Mr. Browning 
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found it particularly unusual to see someone there, because his 
house was secluded (there were no homes behind it, it was 
surrounded by pine trees and hills), and traffic around his home 
was minimal during that time of day (T. 61-66). Mr. Browning 
opened his back door, startling defendant, who stepped forward 
and stood about three feet away from Mr. Browning (T. 70). When 
Mr. Browning asked defendant what he was doing, the defendant 
said that he was looking for his boss's home on Evergreen Drive 
(T. 71). Evergreen Drive was some two miles away from Mr. 
Browning's home, and the entire Summit Park subdivision was 
marked by street signs (T. 71). In Mr. Browning's eight years of 
living in that home, none of the many people who ceune to his home 
for directions to another address came to the back door - they 
all knocked on the front door (T. 85, 88). Mr. Browning told 
defendant that he was "quite a ways off the beaten trail," and 
directed him to Evergreen Drive (T. 71). During the 
conversation, defendant shielded his face with his hands (T. 72). 
After defendant left, Mr. Browning took his children, 
one of whom was sick, to the doctor (T. 73). After returning 
from the doctors' offices, Mr. Browning called the sheriff to 
report his encounter with defendant (T. 73). He failed to 
identify anyone in the first photograph array (defendant's 
picture was not included therein (T. 123)), and during the second 
photograph array he identified defendant as the man in his 
backyard (T. 75). During defendant's trial, Mr. Browning 
identified defendant as the man he saw on May 14, 1987 in his 
backyard (T. 66). While defendant's jury did not reach a verdict 
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on the criminal trespass charge, which was based on the events 
that occurred at the Browning residence, the facts which occurred 
at the Browning residence are relevant on appeal because they 
demonstrate defendant's presence in the vicinity of the crime on 
the day of the crime, and his knowledge of the location of the 
approximate crime scene. 
On May 14, 1987, Mark J. Ingersoll was living with his 
daughter in a home on 145 Evergreen Drive, Summit Park (T. 90-
91). On that day, he and his daughter locked and left their home 
between eight and eight-thirty in the morning (T. 91). They 
returned home together at nine in the evening, to find that 
someone, without permission, had entered their home from the 
north deck window, and had ransacked the closets, and taken 
several items (T. 92-96). Items missing included a video 
cassette recorder worth $900 (T. 97), a portable television worth 
$250 (T. 97), two diamond rings worth $500 each (T. 97), from $75 
to $100 in cash (T. 97), four silver dollars worth a total of $50 
(T. 97), and a leather bag worth $35 (T. 98). A 25-caliber 
automatic pistol was also taken (T. 98). The doors to the home 
and the screen to the north deck window were damaged by the 
intruder. (T. 98). 
In Mr. Ingersoll's daughter's bedroom, which had been 
ransacked, Mr. Ingersoll found a Coor's Light beer can on the 
dresser (T. 98). The can was not in that location when the 
Ingersolls left their home on the morning of May 14, 1987, and 
Mr. Ingersoll testified that he did not leave the can there, and 
that he did not allow his daughter to drink alcoholic beverages 
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(T. 99). Mr. Ingersoll pointed out the beer can to Larry Henley, 
the investigating officer (T. 98-99). 
Larry Henley gave the beer can, which he had placed 
inside a plastic bag, to Detective Offrett (T. 105), who 
transferred it to Scott Pratt, at the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification (T. 120). Scott Pratt, of the State Crime 
Laboratory, examined the beer can found in Mr. Ingersoll's 
daughter's bedroom and removed a print therefrom (T. 150). He 
testified that the print from the beer can matched the print from 
one of defendant's palm print cards made while defendant was 
incarcerated (T. 173-174). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's refusal to obey the court's order to submit 
to repeat palm printing, in order to cure this objection prior to 
trial, precludes defendant's ability to argue on appeal the 
admissibility of the original prints, which were properly 
admitted under the rules of evidence. Defendant overemphasizes 
the significance of the palm print exhibits in the prosecution's 
case; they were not necessary to the testimony of the palm print 
expert. 
Theft of a gun and theft of property exceeding $1,000 
in value were properly charged as separate crimes because the two 
crimes do not share identical elements. Regardless of the 
propriety of the charges, because defendant was sentenced to 





THE PALM PRINT EXHIBITS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Defendant argues that Exhibit 7, the palm print cards, 
were admitted in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 1002, which 
reads: 
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or 
photograph, the original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in 
these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court of this State or by Statute. 
This Court's standard of review for this issue is the "abuse of 
discretion" standard. State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 284, 501 P.2d 
636, 637-8 (1972). The two Utah Rules of Evidence which allow 
for the trial court's action in admitting Exhibit 7 are rules 
1003 and 1004. Rule 1003 provides that: 
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an 
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to 
the authenticity of the original or (2) in the 
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate 
in lieu of the original. 
Defendant claims that Rule 1003 was inapplicable at trial because 
of his numerous challenges to the authenticity of the documents: 
The State could not show where the copies came from 
(R126; Pg. 134, 1. 15 to pg. 136, 1. 2); the State did 
not know or show who made the copies (R126: pg. 134, 1. 
15-22); the State did not show who had custody of the 
originals and what precautions were taken to avoid 
tampering (R126: Pg. 135, 1. 2 to pg. 136, 1. 2); it 
was shown that copies did not represent the full 
original documents but only portions (R126: pg. 167, 1. 
17 to page. 170, 1.15) and,; there was a discrepancy 
between the appearance of Defendant's signature on the 
two cards (R126: pg. 133, 1. 1-13). 
However, the authenticity of the exhibit was well 
established by the testimony of the person who took the prints, 
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Mr. Carr. On May 28, 1987, Darrin Carr, the jailer of the Salt 
Lake County Jail took palm prints from defendant (T. 130). These 
were the only palm prints that Mr. Carr had taken during his 
extensive career in fingerprints at the jail (T. 131). The cards 
on which the prints were taken bore typed identification of 
defendant, and the signature of Mr. Carr (T. 132). Mr. Carr 
watched defendant sign both the left and right hand cards, the 
latter one in a rather shaky manner because defendant signed that 
one after the print was made, and he was holding his hand in an 
unnatural manner in order to prevent the print from smearing (T. 
133). Mr. Carr testified that he knew the exhibits of the prints 
were duplicates of the prints he had made because he recognized 
his signature, and defendant's signatures, which Mr. Carr had 
witnessed (T. 136). Further, the exhibits conformed with Mr. 
Carr's memory of his use of two different card sides for the two 
different hands (T. 166-167). See James Manufacturing Co. v. 
Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 210, 390 P.2d 127, 129 (1964) ("Plaintiff 
objected to the introduction of this exhibit upon the grounds 
that it was not the best evidence and that production of the 
original had not been demanded by defendant. This contention is 
without merit. The exhibit was authenticated by defendant and 
was apparently written in response to a letter sent to him by 
plaintiff. Under such circumstances, the carbon copy was 
admissible as a 'duplicate original.'") 
Even if the exhibits were not admissible as duplicates 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 1003, they were admissible under Rule 
1004, which reads: 
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The original is not required, and other 
evidence of the contents of a writing, 
recording, or photograph is admissible if: 
(1) Originals lost or 
destroyed. All originals are lost 
or have been destroyed, unless the 
proponent lost or destroyed them 
in bad faith; or 
(2) Original not obtainable. 
No original can be obtained by any 
available judicial process or 
procedure; or 
(3) Original in possession of 
opponent. At a time when an 
original was under the control of 
the party against whom offered, he 
was put on notice, by the 
pleadings or otherwise, that the 
content would be a subject of 
proof at the hearing, and he does 
not produce the original at the 
hearing; or 
(4) Collateral matters. The 
writing, recording, or photograph 
is not closely related to a 
controlling issue. 
Review of the trial testimony establishes that the 
original prints qualified for admission under subparagraphs (1) 
and (2) of Rule 1004. Mr. Carr testified at trial that the print 
exhibits were duplicates of the originals, and that he and the 
city employees did not know where the originals were (apparently 
there was some speculation on the part of the city employees that 
a detective working on the case had the originals)(T. 133). 
Officer Offrett testified that he had contacted the city records 
department and Sergeant Jensen, who had sent the duplicates to 
Officer Offrett, but neither could locate the original print 
cards (T. 143). When Mr. Levine, defendant's attorney, 
challenged the authenticity of the duplicates, Mr. Carr admitted 
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that he left the print cards with his sergeant, that they were 
presumably sent to the department thereafter, that he did not 
make the copies, and that he did not know where the originals 
were (T. 135-136). See State v. Tugglef 28 Utah 284, 501 P.2d 
636, 637-8 (1972)("While the principal custodian of the records 
was out of the state and unable to testify, other employees 
testified as to the correctness of the copies. The State moved 
for a continuance so that the absent witness might be brought 
back to testify. The court, however, refused to grant a 
continuance, apparently convinced that his testimony would not be 
necessary."). The palm print exhibit was admissible under 
subparagraphs (1) and (2) of Rule of Evidence 1004. 
Further, it is arguable that the palm print exhibit was 
admissible under subparagraph (3) of Rule 1004, which is titled 
"Original in possession of opponent." A review of the record 
indicates that during the preliminary hearing, the print from the 
Coor's Light can and the defendant's matching print were offered 
into evidence, but defense counsel objected to the admission, 
attacking the authenticity of the matching palm print (R. 20). 
The hearing was continued so that Mr. Carr, the officer who took 
the prints from defendant, could come and testify for the court 
(R. 29). When the State had difficulty producing this witness, 
and sought to obtain new prints from defendant, his counsel filed 
a motion for a protective order, arguing that if defendant were 
forced to give his prints, it would violate his fifth amendment 
right against self-incrimination (R. 20-21). Subsequently, after 
the court ordered defendant to submit to additional 
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fingerprinting, and defendant refused to do so, the court ordered 
the State to obtain an affidavit from the Bureau of Criminal 
Investigations (R. 27). At a later continuation of the 
Preliminary Hearing, Mr. Carr was able to testify for the State 
concerning the printing process, and the authenticity of the 
copies of the original prints (R. 31). At that hearing, the 
prints were admitted over the objection of defendant that the 
print exhibits were duplicates, not originals (R. 32). 
In these circumstances, defendant was certainly on 
notice that the print exhibits would be "subject of proof" at the 
trial. He had access, not to the originals of the duplicates in 
Exhibit 7, but to the original originals - his actual palm 
prints. In fact, he was under court order to produce them prior 
to trial, but failed to do so. Particularly in view of 
defendant's refusal to cooperate with the trial court in 
producing additional prints, the trial court was acting within 
its discretion in admitting the duplicates. See Meyer v. General 
American Corporation, 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 1977) (oral 
testimony concerning the contents of unavailable business records 
was properly admitted as secondary evidence under old Rule of 
Evidence 70 because records were in hands of president of party 
company, who refused access to the records). 
Defendant makes much of the fact that the palmprint 
exhibit was "so crucial to the State and so damaging to the 
defendant" (Appellant's Brief p.7). He fails to recognize that 
the palm print expert most likely could have testified, without 
the exhibits, that defendant's palm print, taken while he was 
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incarcerated, matched the one on the beer can in the Ingersoll 
home. See State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 268-270 (Utah 
1985)(ballistics expert may testify, with sufficient foundation, 
about ballistics tests without photographs and other physical 
exhibits for comparison). While testimony on the palm print 
match, without comparison exhibits, perhaps would have been less 
convincing to the jurors, it is doubtful that the degree of proof 
contributed by the exhibits is as great as that attributed to 
them by defendant. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED WITH THEFT OF 
PROPERTY OVER $1,000 AND THEFT OF A FIREARM, 
TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Defendant claims that he was improperly convicted of 
theft of property over $1,000 and theft of a firearm, noting that 
both thefts occurred during the same time and at the same place, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, which reads as follows: 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punishable 
as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property 
or services exceeds $1,000, or 
(ii) The property stolen is a 
firearm or an operable motor 
vehicle; or 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property 
or services is more than $250 
but not more than $1,000, 
• • • • 
(ii) When the property taken is 
a stallion, mare, colt, 
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gelding, cow, heifer, steer, 
ox, bull, calf,, sheep, goat, 
mule, jack, jenny, swine, or 
poultry. 
The statute which controls defendant's duplicitous 
charge argument is Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402, which provides, in 
part, as follows: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of 
this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
The general rule for determining whether charged 
offenses are duplicitous is stated in State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 
133, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983), "whether each of the offenses charged 
requires proof of an additional element of the crime which the 
other does not and if an additional fact is required, the 
offenses are not duplicitous." JId. at 1372. That court further 
explains that "duplicity does not depend upon whether the facts 
proved at trial are actually used to support conviction of both 
offenses, rather, it turns upon whether the necessary elements of 
proof of the one crime are included in the other." IdL at 1374. 
Utah law appears to accord with these principles. See State v. 
Smathere, 602 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1979)("Defendant's second point 
is that the conduct prohibited . . . for rape . . • is the same 
conduct prohibited • . . for aggravated sexual assault. • • . 
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reading of the statutes referred to, it is amply clear that the 
elements of the two crimes are not the same.") 
Reviewing the theft statute set out above demonstrates 
that theft of a gun and theft of $1,000 differ in the element 
describing the object of the theft. And neither crime is 
necessarily included in the other. Defendant here stole a gun 
and property exceeding $1,000 in value, and was properly charged 
with both offenses as they were defined by the Utah legislature. 
Such legislative distinctions between crimes have previously been 
approved of by the courts. See e.g., State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 
841, 841-845 (Utah 1981)(defendant, charged with theft of 
livestock for taking three turkeys, failed in challenging theft 
statute's classification of theft of livestock as a third degree 
felony without regard to value of livestock taken, because 
legislature's distinctive recognition of livestock was rational). 
Numerous cases factually parallel the instant one, and 
demonstrate that this defendant was properly charged with, 
convicted of, and sentenced for all of the crimes which occurred 
during the criminal episode of May 14, 1987. See State v. 
Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah App. 1987) (placing mouth on 
the victim's breasts and touching her vagina were separate 
chargeable offenses in one criminal episode); State v. O'Brien, 
721 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1986)(defendants were properly 
convicted and sentenced separately for each crime of aggravated 
burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft of 
firearms, although each of these separate acts occurred during 
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one criminal episode); State v, Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 
1985)(defendant was properly convicted of two separate counts of 
burglary for burglarizing an apartment and the apartment's 
laundry facilities, which were separately secured because 
"[ajlthough defendant's crimes were committed during a single 
criminal episode, he committed two distinct burglaries separately 
punishable under section 76-1-402."). See also State v. Bradley, 
752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1985) ("'where the two crimes are such 
that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having 
committed the lesser, then as a matter of law they stand in the 
relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant 
cannot be convicted or punished for both.'"). 
Because defendant's sentences on all three second 
degree felony convictions were ordered to run concurrently, even 
if it were error to have convicted defendant of both theft of 
property over $1,000 and theft of a firearm, it would be harmless 
error. People v. Morgan, 539 P.2d 130, 131 (Colo. 1975) 
(convicting defendant of two counts of conspiracy based factually 
on one criminal episode was error, but harmless error because 
sentence for conspiracy ran concurrently with those for 
legitimate convictions). See also State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 98 
(Utah 1983) ("When a defendant has been improperly convicted of 
both a greater and a lesser offense, it is appropriate to regard 
the conviction on the lesser offense as mere surplusage, which 




The trial court acted within its discretion in 
admitting Exhibit 7, the duplicates of the palm prints of 
defendant. The authenticity of the duplicates was established at 
trial, the original was lost, and defendant had control over the 
best evidence of his palm prints, and refused to cooperate in 
providing the same for the trial court. 
Defendant was properly charged with theft of property 
over $lf000 and theft of a firearm. While both crimes occurred 
during the same criminal episode, and while the same facts from 
that episode are used in establishing some of the elements for 
both of the crimes, the element dealing with the object of the 
theft differs between the two crimes. Several rational bases 
exist to explain the distinction drawn by the legislature (i.e. 
the right to bear arms is constitutionally protected; burglars 
should not have guns), and the trial court acted properly in 
allowing defendant to be convicted of both crimes defined by the 
legislature. 
If the two crimes were charged in a duplicitous fashion 
in this case, the trial court's concurrent sentencing removed the 
prejudice that might have been caused in that event. 
Defendant'8 convictions should be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this J\ day of January, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
—,,. if f// — ' /1 J *—f^— 
ELIZABETH H0LBR0OK ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Elliott Levine, attorney for defendant, 4168 South 1785 West, 
West Valley City, Utah 84119, this ~'-\ day of January, 1989. 
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